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An ‘option-pricing’ model is employed to analyse when a firm should 
expand its production capabilities abroad. In a framework where the 
firm’s profits are determined by some average of the attractiveness of the 
home and foreign countries, and attractiveness in each country follows 
differentiated Brownian motions, this paper derives an optimal trigger 
value for FDI. The model shows that, contrary to the NPV rule, FDI entry 
should be optimally delayed the greater the uncertainty surrounding the 
future path of attractiveness in both locations. Another important result is 
that MNEs do not regard FDI as a risk diversification tool. The second 
part of the paper is devoted to empirically test the results of the model. 
Drawing on data of FDI from the US into a panel of developed and 
developing countries and using labour costs as a proxy for (the reciprocal 
of) attractiveness, our estimation confirms the results of the model, in 
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The surge of globalisation has presented multinational firms with new opportunities but 
also tougher challenges. In an ever faster changing market environment, the optimal 
timing for expanding abroad becomes of utmost relevance for firms considering 
engaging in FDI. In that regard, this paper sets up a stochastic model that provides an 
optimal rule for the timing of FDI-entry and tests empirically the appropriateness of such 
optimal rule. 
The analysis of the timing of FDI has traditionally relied on the cost-benefit analysis, 
according to which the firm should engage in FDI whenever the net present value (NPV) 
of the investment is non-negative. However, since the NPV rule is oblivious of the 
irreversibility of most FDI projects and also of the uncertain nature of the future payoff 
of such ventures, it is likely to provide flawed guidance as to the optimal timing of FDI-
entry. In the real world, exchange rate volatility, price fluctuations, productivity changes, 
political instability, among others, render the outcome of any investment uncertain, so 
that a firm might have to wait for more information before optimally engaging in FDI, 
especially when investment costs cannot be fully recovered later on. Since in most cases 
the firm is not compelled to engage in FDI at any specific moment, it holds an option to 
invest abroad that should only be exercised when it is optimal to do so. The point is that 
in an context of uncertainty there is an opportunity cost associated with committing 
resources rather than waiting for new information so that the present value of the 
investment payoffs must exceed the investment costs by the value of keeping the firm’s 
option to invest unexercised (Pindyck, 1988). 
Taking on board the high degree of irreversibility associated with most FDI ventures 
and also the uncertainty attached to the success of such ventures, this paper develops an 
  1‘option-pricing’ model
1 with the intent of investigating when should a firm expand its 
production capabilities abroad. The firm is assumed to continuously maximise 
intertemporal utility, which depends on the level of capital invested and also on the 
attractiveness of the locations where the firm is installed. The attractiveness of the home 
and foreign countries, which is here understood to measure the location’s potential in 
generating profits, are assumed to follow differentiated Brownian motions. Letting the 
overall attractiveness to be determined by a geometric average of the attractiveness of the 
home and foreign countries weighted by the shares of capital committed to each location, 
the model sets out to derive the value of keeping the option of FDI alive. The main 
output of the model consists of a threshold that bisects the firm’s decision-making space 
into a zone where it is optimal to exercise the FDI option and a zone where the firm 
maximises its value by leaving the option unexercised, so that it becomes apparent when 
exactly should the firm engage in FDI. The results of the model suggest, among other 
things, that FDI-entry should take longer the higher the uncertainty regarding the future 
path of attractiveness in both locations. Moreover, we show that the theoretical results 
are empirically substantiated by our empirical results of United States MNEs’ FDI into a 
panel of developed and developing countries. 
The results derived in this paper are tuned in with the bulk of the empirical research 
undertaken recently on the role of uncertainty and irreversibility on the timing and extent 
of FDI. In fact, the recent FDI literature reveals that overall, empirical evidence points to 
a general negative relation between entry events and uncertainty. Rivoli and Solario 
(1996) argue that ownership and internalisation advantages, which make FDI more 
irreversible, may be negatively related with entry events, as firms become more sceptical 
about the overall success of the venture. Erramilli and D’Souza (1995) examined 
                                                 
1 This model applies the methodology developed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) to investment decisions 
under uncertainty and follows Strobel’s (1999) application of this particular methodology. 
  2empirically the effects of uncertainty on the firms’ decision to engage in FDI instead of 
exporting or licensing to identify two antagonistic effects of uncertainty on FDI. On one 
side, and as expected, uncertainty about the functioning of the firm’s specific market in 
the host country discourages FDI in detriment of alternative modes of market-
penetration. On the other side, uncertainty makes the physical presence of the firm in the 
foreign market more valuable as it allows the firm to get a better grasp of the market’s 
characteristics and so improve its overall risk management. Campa (1993) tests the 
effects that real exchange rate fluctuations had on FDI into the United States during the 
1980’s. The results point to exchange rate volatility being negatively related to the 
number of foreign firms entering the market. This negative effect is evident in industries 
with relatively high sunk investment costs in tangible and intangible assets. Goldberg 
(1990) finds a strong negative relation between long term exchange rate volatility and 
entry events during both the 1970s and the 1980s in the United States, which he 
attributes to high risk-aversion and rising costs. However, short-term exchange rate 
volatility is found to coincide with investment expansion, possibly reflecting increased 
short-term expected profits (Goldberg, 1990; Goldberg and Kolststad, 1994). 
In the context of the literature on the effects of uncertainty and irreversibility on FDI, 
the present paper not only develops an analytical framework based on the option-pricing 
theory that formalises the main empirical results in a rather general fashion, but also 
provides new empirical evidence. The use of ‘option-pricing’ models that capture the 
role of uncertainty in international economics issues is not novel as it has been 
extensively applied to international trade theory since the mid-1980s. Some of the most 
influential contributions focused on providing a theoretical argument to explain the 
hysteretic effect that the large exchange rate swings of the 1980s had on trade prices and 
quantities. Foreign firms that entered the United States market during the first half of the 
  31980s, when the real value of the United States dollar was appreciating, could not exit 
when the United States dollar returned to its original level due to the sunk costs incurred. 
The exchange rate would have had to decline strictly below the level that triggered entry 
in order to induce firms to exit (Baldwin, 1988; Baldwin and Krugman, 1989; Dixit, 
1989a; 1989b). This particular episode illustrates once again the inappropriateness of the 
NPV rule in explaining events dominated by the uncertainty of the underlying variables. 
A crucial implication of the theoretical and empirical results established in this paper 
is that the NPV rule is blatantly misguiding in any context other than the unrealistic 
setting where sunk costs are negligible and there is certainty regarding the determinants 
of the profitability of the project to be undertaken. Under more realistic assumptions it 
becomes immediately apparent that a positive NPV does not necessarily render 
investment optimal since an unexpected turn of events may bring the NPV into negative 
territory in which case the firm has to choose between staying in business and sustaining 
negative profits or pulling-out of the market without fully making up for the sunk costs 
incurred. In other words, the higher the uncertainty regarding the profitability of the FDI 
initiative, that is, the more likely is a favourable situation to turn into an unfavourable 
one and vice-versa, the more the firm gains from waiting for more information before 
committing itself to investment (or dis-investment) whenever there are significant sunk 
costs. This result, which is a prediction of the “option-pricing” approach to the analysis 
of irreversible investment under uncertainty (Dixit, 1989a; 1989b; Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994) is formally derived in the present paper. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the first part, a stochastic option-pricing 
model of FDI-entry is set up and solved and its results analysed. In the second part, the 
data and the estimation method are described and the empirical results discussed. 
  4MODEL 
Consider the problem of a firm whose production is located exclusively at home but is 
contemplating expanding its production capabilities abroad. The firm will engage in FDI 
only if such a move is deemed beneficial in the medium and long run. That in turn will 
depend on the perceived evolution of the relative attractiveness as production sites and 
selling grounds of foreign countries candidates to host the foreign subsidiary of the home 
country’s firm. In that particular context, attractiveness is seen as a broad measure of 
return for the medium/long term, comprising indicators such as output growth, market 
size, costs of production and macroeconomic and political stability, as seen by the firm. 
This attractiveness concept applies to both domestic and foreign economies. 
Unlike other models of investment under uncertainty, such as that of Caballero and 
Pindyck (1992), the type of competition and other market functioning features need not 
to be specified here, since prices and other relevant information pertaining to the 
particular market setting are encapsulated in the attractiveness indicator. It follows that 
this model’s results are not hostage to a specific market setting. The attractiveness 
variable can be built such as to allow a measure of total profits (
~
Π), highly correlated 
with actual total profits, to be given by
2: 
~
Π tK t A t af af af =⋅  
Where K and A denote the firm’s stock of capital and level of overall attractiveness as 
seen by the firm, respectively. In this model, the capital stock is determined optimally 
                                                 
)
n
2 Even though in reality the firm may consider factors other than profit, from the modelling standing point 
it seems reasonable to introduce the simplification according to which attractiveness is regarded as the 
foreign location’s potential in generating profits per unit of capital invested by the firm. In this context, 
attractiveness can be formalised as follows. Actual total profits are given by: 
, where R denotes the total revenues function and C, the total costs 
function. The profit per unit of capital invested is, 
Π= − = − () ( RC r x x c y y
n 11 ,..., ,...,
π =− ( ) = ( ) RCK p x xy y
n 11 ,..., , ,...,
n . By defining the 
attractiveness of one location as: ( ) x x y y n m Aa i == ii
~ ,,,,, 11 LL π
() i ⋅
, where i indexes the location, it follows 
that, since the function a  depends on the same variables as  () p ⋅ , it can be chosen so that   and  Π
~
Π  are 
highly correlated. 
  5through the maximisation of the firm’s utility function, whereas attractiveness is 
stochastic and follows a geometric Brownian motion: 
dA Adt Adz =+ α σ , where dz dt t = ε  is the increment of a Wiener process and 
ε t iid N ~, 01 af , E ts ε ε b g = 0 for ts ≠ . 
Due to the uncertain nature of the outcome of any investment venture, the firm takes into 
consideration the fact that it can sustain losses at any time, which like profits, are 
increasing in the stock of capital, the only variable the firm has control over. Assuming 
that the firm is risk-averse
3, its instantaneous utility function can be written as: 




where r measures the relative weight of the downside risk of investment and must be 
positive if the firm is risk-averse, as assumed. 
The first term on the RHS of equation (1) is a measure of profit, whereas the second 
term is a measure of risk. The fact that the second term is quadratic so that the utility 
function is concave in this second term just reflects the firm’s risk aversion stance in the 
sense that the more capital the firm commits to the venture, the higher becomes the scope 
for losses. Hence, the bigger r, or the more risk-averse investors are, the lower becomes 
the instantaneous utility derived by the firm from overall investment, including FDI. 
Since the firm can adjust its stock of capital according to the present realisation and 
future expectations of attractiveness (the state variable), it will do so in order to 
maximise the following intertemporal utility function: 
UA E A K rK e d t t
t a f a f a f a f af =− R S T
U V W
∞ −− z ττ τ
µτ 1
2
2 τ  (2) 
where µ is the time-discount rate. 
                                                 
3 In this context, risk-aversion means that the firm is more concerned with the downside than the upside 
risks of profits. 
  6It turns out that the firm is an expected utility maximiser. However, notice that the 
measure of risk used is given by the square of capital rather than the variance of profits, 
as it usually appears in expected utility maximising problems. By doing this, we are 
deliberately assuming that the ‘risk of profit’ is a function of the scale of capital
4, since 
in effect it is the size of the project that determines the ‘size’ of risk. 
The solution to this Max problem requires solving the following Bellman equation: 
µUA M a xuKA
dt
Ed U





Applying Ito’s lemma, we can write equation (3) as: 


















2 σ  (3a) 
Maximisation of the right-hand side of the above expression involves setting the stock of 





=  (4) 
Equation (4) implies that the optimal stock of capital varies positively with the level of 
contemporaneous attractiveness in a proportion inversely related to the degree of risk-
aversion. Intuitively, the optimal level of capital increases with   because more 
capital boosts instantaneous total profits and decreases with 
At af
r, since additional capital 
raises the costs associated with the risk of future losses. Substituting (4) into (2) we get 










µτ τ  (5) 
                                                 
4 Since  K  is being determined endogenously and so is constant at any period τ ,   is a measure of 
the scale of capital, not of its variance. 
() [] K τ
2
  7Bearing in mind that   follows a geometric Brownian motion, we can use the 
properties of the lognormal distribution
At af








2 22 µα σ
 (6) 
provided that µ α σ −−> 2
2 0
h
, which will be assumed here to ensure the convergence of 
the integral in (5). Intuitively, this condition forces intertemporal utility to be bounded by 
imposing the time preference to be higher than the rate at which the square of 
attractiveness is expected to increase. 
Utility Before and After FDI 
Since the variables that determine the level of attractiveness behave differently from 
country to country, we must characterise attractiveness in the home country and in the 
potential host countries differently. As there is no a priori reason to believe that the 
attractiveness of any given country drifts away in a specific direction, we assume that 
irrespective of the country in question, attractiveness always follows a driftless stochastic 
process
6. In particular we assume that: 
dA A dz hh h = σ  (7) 
dA A dz ff f = f σ  (8) 
where the subscripts h and  f  denote home and foreign, respectively, with 
 and  σσ ρ hf t hf Ed z d z d t ,, ≥ 0 c h = ρ is the correlation coefficient between the random 
shocks affecting attractiveness in the home and foreign countries. 
The utility of the firm prior to engaging in FDI can be derived by combining 
equations (6) and (7): 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Aitchison and Brown (1957). 
6The fact that we have eliminated the possibility that attractiveness contains a deterministic trend does not 
preclude attractiveness of a particular country from drifting persistently away from its unconditional mean 













provided that µ σ −> h
2 0, which will be assumed here. 
Applying Ito’s lemma to UA and ignoring the terms of order  hh b g dt
3
2 af and higher, 
gives: 
dU U dt U dz hh h h h =+ h σ σ
2 2  (10) 
which means that U  also follows a geometric Brownian motion.  h
However, once the firm expands its production to a foreign country, overall 
attractiveness, as seen by the firm, becomes an average of both locations weighted by the 
share of capital assigned to each location: 
At At At o h
s
f
s h af af af =
f  (11) 
where   denotes the overall attractiveness, s  and s  are the shares of capital employed 
at home and at the host country, respectively, with ss
Ao h f
hf + =1.  
Using Ito’s lemma it can be shown that the stochastic process followed by overall 
attractiveness,   is also a geometric Brownian motion:  At oaf
dA s s A dt A s dz s dz o hf
hf
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22
2
c h c h (12) 
Combining equations (6), (11) and (12) we can determine that the firm’s utility after it 
has invested abroad as: 
U
At At






hf h f h f h h f f
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22 2 2 22 4 µσ σ ρ σ σ σ σ
 (13) 
provided µσ σ ρ σ σ σ σ ++ − − − ss s s hf h f h f h h f f 24
22 2 2 c h > 0 , which will be assumed. 
Using Ito’s lemma, we can confirm that U  also follows a geometric Brownian 
motion: 
t oaf
  9dU s s s s s s U dt s dz s dz U oh f h h f f h f h f o h h h f f f =− − + + + c hc h c h σσρ σ σ σ σ
22 4 2 o  (14) 
Optimal Stopping Problem 
When the firm is producing exclusively in the home country its decision of whether or 
not to engage in FDI constitutes an optimal stopping problem for which the relevant 
Bellman equation is: 
IU U M a xU U
dt




, g  (15) 
where   is the value of the option to invest in a foreign country, UU IU U h o , b g oh −  
accounts for the expected discounted utility gain that results from opting for FDI and the 
second term in the curly brackets yields the time-discounted expected increment in the 
value of the option that ensues from keeping the option unexercised for an additional 
lapse of time, dt. The range of values for which the second term in the curly brackets is 
greater than the first defines the continuation region, where it is optimal not to exercise 
the option. In this region the Bellman equation is given by: 
IU U
dt
Ed I UU h ot h o , b g b g =
1
µ
,  (16) 
Applying Ito’s lemma to (16) yields the partial differential equation that the function 
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22 2 12 12 4 0 chbg bg ,  
The set of boundary conditions that applies to this optimal stopping problem is composed 
of a value-matching condition, 
IU U U U ho o
** * , ch =− h
*  

















** , c h
1 
The vector c  defines the boundary line that separates the b  space into a 
stopping region, where it is optimal to engage in FDI and a continuation region, where it 
is optimal to refrain from investing abroad. The derivation of the option value function 
 from the partial differential equation (16) and the corresponding boundary 
conditions although possible is unnecessary. Since the optimal choice regarding FDI 
depends exclusively on the relative value of the utility attained before and after FDI has 
been undertaken, that is, on the ratio 
UU ho
** , h UU h o , g
IU U h o , b g
u  we can impose homogeneity of degree one 
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0 b g a f = F
HG I
KJ =  (18) 
Such transformation allows us to re-write (16) as a function of u rather than b :  UU h, 0g







ss ss s s u
di
du
fh f h f h fh f hf h f h f σσ ρ σ σ σ σ ρσ σ +− + − + − + ch c h bg




which turns out to be an ordinary differential equation. The corresponding boundary 
conditions becomes: 
iu u









c h c h
−= 1 −
                                                
Notice that equation (19) imposes a supplementary boundary condition: i   00 af =
 
7 This solution strategy borrows from Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p.210). 
  11Solution to the Optimal Stopping Problem 
Before deriving the full solution notice that equation (19) becomes degenerate, that is  () 0 = u i , 
when two particular sets of the parameters’ values materialise. For the non-stochastic where 
0 = = f h σ σ  attractiveness is both locations is constant and so the value of the option to engage 
in FDI must be zero. The option is still worthless for the symmetric case where  f h σ σ = , 
1 = ρ , in which circumstances uncertainty affects precisely in the same way the attractiveness in 
both locations. 
To solve the optimal stopping problem given by equation (19) and the respective 
boundary conditions, we must search for a solution and test its validity by substituting it 
into equation (19). Considering iu B u a f =
β, we find out that it constitutes a solution to 
(19) if and only if β is a root of the following quadratic equation: 
Qs s s s s s ss fh f h f h h f f f h f f f h f β σ σ ρ σσ β σ σ ρ σσ β a f ch c h c h {} =+ − + − − − − + + 22 1 2 1 2 4
22 2 2 2 2 2 2




The roots of Q β af  can be shown to be equal to: 
ββ
σσ ρ σ σµ σ
σσ ρ σ σ
12
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where  bss s s s s s hh f f f h f f fhf =− − − − + + σσ
22 2 2 12 12 4 c h c h ρ σ σ . Since for −< < 11 ρ  
the coefficient of β
2 in (20) is positive, Q β af
Qs s s s s s hf h fh fh f h f 11 2 1 2 4
22 af c h b g =− +− + − σσ ρ σ σ
 is an upward-pointing parabola. Moreover, 
since   and Q µ 0 af = h
2 − σ µ are 
both negative by previous assumptions
8, it follows that β1 1 >  and β 2 0 < . 
The general solution for equation (20) is then, iu Bu Bu a f = + 12
12 β β , which simplifies to 
iu Bu a f = 1
1 β , since B2 0 =  in order to satisfy the boundary condition, i .  00 af =
                                                 
8 See assumptions concerning equations (13) and (9) for Q(1) and Q(0), respectively. 
  12Making use of the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, we get the 






















Now, since β1 1 > , equation (21) implies that u , meaning that the firm will only 
engage in FDI if the expected utility after investing abroad exceeds that attained when 
production is exclusively carried out domestically. Put differently, contrary to what the 
NPV principle would suggest, the set of parameters’ values for which the firm is 
indifferent between engaging in, and abstaining from FDI, yields a utility after FDI 
strictly greater than that associated with utility before FDI. In other words, when the 
outcome of the FDI venture is uncertain the firm is not willing to take the risk associated 
with FDI even for certain states of nature for which it expects to be strictly better-off 
than before. 
* >1
In order to obtain the critical value as a function of the ratio of the model’s state 
























With equation (21) and (23) we are now in position to derive the expression in terms of 










































*  it is optimal not to engage in FDI, conversely, 
if the value of the ratio is greater than the critical value, the firm should invest abroad. It 
follows that equation (24) defines the line that divides the c  space into two 
regions: one where it is optimal to exercise the FDI option and another where it is not. 
AA hf , h
In order to do some comparative statics we will simplify the original setup and 
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a f afaf ch
a f c h a fc h
 (25) 
It follows from the above equation and the previous assumptions on the parameters that 






*  above 
which the firm should optimally engage in FDI is greater than one. This means that the 
firm will only invest abroad if the attractiveness associated with FDI strictly exceeds that 
of a situation of exclusive home production and that is due to uncertainty of the future 
path of attractiveness. 














, the greater the volatility (i.e. the 
higher σ ) the higher must be the foreign attractiveness relatively to the home country’s 
to make it optimal for the firm to invest abroad. The more correlated are the shocks 
affecting the attractiveness both at home and abroad, the less the FDI option is worth and 








11. The reason is that the more correlated shocks are, the more closely both 
attractivenesses move and so the lower the uncertainty that results from the switch from 
                                                 
9 Because the expression for the derivative is too long it is shown in Appendix. 
  14a situation where production is exclusively carried out at home to one where the firm 
extends its production facilities abroad. It follows from this result that the decision 
concerning FDI is not primarily geared at diversifying the firm’s overall activity risk, 
quite the contrary. Intuitively, this result conforms with the notion that FDI springs off 
MNE’s wanting to ‘export’ a successful ‘business formula’ usually based on an unique 
intangible asset advantage. This means that FDI is likelier to succeed in host markets that 
are similar to the home market, implying that a typical MNE should favour ‘global’ to 
‘disperse’ management of risk and so avoid geographical dispersion as a risk 
diversification tool. 
In regard to the discount rate, the greater is the firm’s time discount rate, the less it 






*  that triggers optimal entry, 







11. This result stems from the fact that a higher time preference 
increases the firm’s opportunity cost of not immediately investing abroad. In the extreme 
case where the firm cares only about the present moment, so that µ →∞, then 
lim
µ β






* =1, so that uncertainty is disregarded and the value of the FDI option 
collapses to zero. 








* > 0, intuition 
suggest that it should be the case. This is because investment expenditures always exhibit 
some degree of irreversibility such that an increase in share of capital invested abroad 
raises the firm’s overall risk exposure. 
These results are extended for equation (24) using simulations (see figures 1-6 in 
Appendix B). The simulations are performed against a benchmark case (see Appendix B 







*  with respect to the parameters of the model: σ h, σ f, ρ, µ, s  and s . 
The simulations carried out on the critical values of relative attractiveness confirm the 
results of the comparative statics discussed above. Figure 1 reveals that the trigger value 
is much more sensitive to 
h f
σ f than to σ h. This is due to the fact that the higher the 
uncertainty in foreign locations, the higher the risk of foreign investments’ returns and so 
the higher must relative attractiveness be in order to trigger FDI-entry. Figure 2 shows 
that the trigger value rises when σ f is high and ρ moves toward minus 1, since such 
combinations entail the highest increase in uncertainty following FDI-entry. Figures 2 
and 5 illustrate that the dampening influence of higher ρ and µ on the critical ratio 
strengthens as σ f increases. Figure 3 confirms that the more the firm has been investing 
abroad, the more exposed to foreign volatility it is, making the trigger value to increase. 
The accentuated curvature of the surface graphed in figure 4, in which the critical value 
of relative attractiveness rises very fast as both σ f and s  increase, indicates that the 
higher is the firm’s exposure abroad the more dominant becomes the uncertainty 
pertaining to the foreign location in the FDI decision. Finally, figure 6 shows that if 
home operations are subject to high uncertainty, the firm will invest abroad only for high 
trigger values. When the firm already faces a considerable amount of uncertainty it needs 
to be compensated for engaging on yet another uncertain venture. 
f
Before proceeding to the empirical application, it would be interesting to 
ascertain, from any point within the continuation region, the likelihood that FDI-entry 
will become optimal in the future. In addition, under the circumstances in which future 
financial liberalisation is a certainty, it is important for the firm to know the expected 
time that will take until the decision of FDI-entry becomes optimal. 
  16Using standard properties of the Brownian motion and the lognormal 
distribution


























*  from any point inside the continuation 
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2                                                                    (27) 
where  12
22 σσ hf − c h  and c  are respectively, the drift and variance 
parameters of the process 
σσ ρ σ σ hf h






Equations (26) and (27) indicate that the probability and expected time for FDI-
entry to become optimal depend on the relative variability of attractiveness in the foreign 
location and at home. The higher is the variability of the foreign country’s attractiveness 





 diverges away from the 
threshold that triggers optimal FDI-entry, and so the lower the probability that FDI will 
                                                 
10 See Dixit (1993, ch.6). 
  17ever become optimal. Similarly, the higher the differential between σ f
2 and σ h
2 the more 





 away from the critical ratio become, and so, the more time 
is the system expected to take until hitting the threshold beyond which FDI-entry is 
optimal. 





 has a negative drift, i.e. when σ σ hf
22 < , 
there is still a positive probability that FDI-entry will become optimal sometime in the 





 being drifting away 
from the critical ratio, there is the possibility that a combination of positive shocks might 
just bring the system towards the threshold barrier. However, the expected time for this 











*  that 
drives the expectation into diverging. 






 on the probability of optimal FDI
11. 
When σ σ h
2 < f












decreasing in σ f
2. This is because, first, the lower σ f











 the more likely is that process to be ‘thrown 
off-course’ by a sequence of positive shocks towards the optimality threshold. Notice 
                                                 
11 The parameters are calibrated with the values shown in the table of appendix B. 





, the probability of optimal FDI rises very fast as 
σ f
2 converges to σ h





 converges to zero from the left. 
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FDI-entry will become optimal with certainty provided that σ σ h
2 > f
2  and it is 





 and the lower σ f
2. For the limiting case where 
σ h
2 = f
2 , even though the probability that the firm will engage in FDI in the future is 
one, the expected time for it to occur is infinite. The intuition behind these apparently 












*  might occur. Thus, since the probabilities for successfully longer hitting 
times do not fall sufficiently fast, and the expectation, which is the average of the 
possible hitting times weighted by their respective probabilities, diverges
12. 






 on the expected time for 
optimal FDI-entry
13. It shows that the lower is σ f





, the sooner is 





 from the trigger value the 
greater is the impact of an increase of σ f
2 on the delay expected before FDI becomes 
optimal. 
                                                 
12 This argument is presented in Dixit (1993, p.56). 
13 The parameters are calibrated with the values shown in the table of appendix B. Notice that our 
simulation benchmark values are expressed in annual terms so that the simulations for the expected time 
for optimal FDI can be read in years. 
  19In summary, the higher is the volatility of attractiveness at home relative to that in 
the foreign location, the more likely FDI-entry is to become optimal and the sooner it is 
expected to occur. Moreover, FDI activities become likelier and are expected sooner, the 













The model presented gives clear indications as to the effects of the parameters pertaining 
to the attractiveness of foreign locations on FDI. It predicts that the higher the volatility 
in foreign locations, σ f, and the share of foreign capital invested in a specific location, 
(henceforth,  ), the more valuable the option to enter will be and so the fewer entry 
events we will observe. Conversely, the higher the attractiveness of the foreign relative 
to the home location, (henceforth, atf ), the higher the discount factor and the higher the 
correlation between the foreign and home attractiveness, the more entry events we would 
expect to observe. Thus, for empirical testing purposes the reduced form of the model 











. However, since the proxy 
used here for the attractiveness of the foreign location is labour cost (lc), we expect to 
observe fewer FDI-entry events as the attractiveness variable (labour costs) rises
14. So, 















The data consists of a firm-level panel of United States FDI into 13 different industries 
of 12 different countries for the period 1988-1996
15. The countries in the panel are 
Canada and Mexico, six countries of the European Union (France, Germany, Italy, 
                                                 
14 In fact, labour costs proxy ‘unattractiveness’ rather than attractiveness. 
15 The data appendix includes a full explanation of each variable and its source. 
  20Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom) and the Southeast Asian New Tigers 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand). The host countries were selected so as 
to produce a mix of the world’s three main economic regions and also to highlight the 
duality between developed and developing countries. In addition to accounting for 
around 60 percent of the total United States FDI, this sample of countries also 
accommodates a wide variety of cultures, income levels, organisation and infrastructures 
and degrees of economic and political stability. 
The attractiveness of foreign locations depends on several factors, such as prices, 
operating and fixed costs, culture, language, legal framework, among others. However, 
the need to choose a proxy for attractiveness implies ignoring many of the factors that 
affect attractiveness. That is a limitation one must be ready to endure in any empirical 
application. Having this limitation in mind, it seems to be the case that MNEs pay 
particular attention to operating costs, of which wage and non-wage labour costs are a 
crucial item. Moreover, labour costs also account for a significant part of the uncertainty 
inherent to any FDI venture, since from the parent company’s stand point, labour costs 
not only vary in response to changes in the local labour market but are also affected by 
other sources of uncertainty such as exchange rate fluctuations. Finally, whilst labour 
costs have scarcely received attention in the related literature, the importance of other 
variables deemed relevant for the decision to engage in FDI under uncertainty has been 
tested in previous contributions. In particular, the linkage between exchange rate 
volatility and FDI has been the focus of many studies, of which Blonigen (1997), Campa 
(1993), Froot and Stein (1991), Goldberg (1990) and Goldberg and Kolststad (1994) are 
notorious examples. 
Bearing on the above considerations, this application uses wages per employee of 
foreign affiliate industry to proxy for the attractiveness of foreign locations. The data are 
  21desegregated into 13 different industries
16. Table 1 in appendix C details the industry 
classifications. 
The next step consists of finding a suitable measure for the United States MNEs’ 
engagement in foreign direct investment, that is, for FDI entry
 17. Ideally we would be 
using the difference between the number of enterprises that entered into and exited from 
foreign locations, but such information is not available for the panel under analysis. 
However, by recognising that a positive capital outflow implies that total entries surpass 
total exits, we choose to use positive capital outflows as a measure of net entry events. In 
addition, for each such entry event, we analyse whether the number of employees in the 
foreign affiliate increased relatively to the previous year. This leads to three ordered 
categories: no entry (FDI = 0); entry with no increase in the number of employees in the 
foreign affiliate (FDI =1); and entry with increased employment in the foreign affiliate 
(FDI = 2). The introduction of the additional entry category, (FDI = 2), reflects the 
need to accommodate two separate issues. First, capital outflows do not necessarily have 
a one-to-one correspondence with real activities as they include all sorts of financial 
flows. Thus, the supplementary criterion enhances the accuracy of the proxy for FDI-
entry used here. Second, since attractiveness has been chosen to be proxied by labour 
costs, the additional employment criterion increases the robustness of the results. 
The variables σ  and ρ embody the firms’ expectations of the future behaviour of the 
level of attractiveness of foreign locations candidates to host United States FDI. The 
variable  σ  measures the idiosyncratic shocks to labour costs, i.e. industry-specific 
                                                 
16 The classification is based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), Revision 2 (Standard 
Industrial Classification Manual, 1987). 
17 United States’ direct investment abroad is typically defined as the ownership or control, directly or 
indirectly, by one United States’ person of 10 percent or more of the voting securities of an incorporated 
foreign business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated foreign business enterprise. Any 
United States investment abroad that is not direct investment by this definition was not covered by the 
BEA benchmark survey. 
 
  22volatility, while ρ stands for the industry-specific correlation between the United States’ 
labour costs and the respective level in the foreign location. The need to quantify 
expectational variables raises the difficult issue of specifying the assumption according 
to which expectations are formed. Since the theoretical model developed in the first part 
does not impose any a priori requirements on how MNEs form expectations, we follow 
Campa (1993) by considering to contrasting hypothesis: static expectations and forward-
looking expectations. However, for the present application, static expectations seems a 
more appropriate, since forward-looking behaviour, by implying that agents are able to 
successfully guess future shocks to their business ventures looks somewhat unrealistic. 
Notwithstanding, for the sake of the generality of our empirical application, we test for 
two distinct models of expectations formation, namely, static expectations and forward-
looking expectations. 
In respect to the former, it is assumed that United States MNEs base their 
expectations on the past three-year performance of the attractiveness’ level of the foreign 
location. Therefore, for each period, σ  and ρ are defined as the moving average of the 
standard deviation and correlation, respectively, of the logarithm of labour costs at 
industry level of the previous three years (excluding the year under observation)
18. The 
latter consists of assuming that firms form their expectation according to the observed 
level of attractiveness of the foreign location three years ahead. In this case, σ  and ρ are 
defined as the moving average of the standard deviation and correlation, respectively, of 
the logarithm of labour costs at industry level three years ahead. Consequently, under 
static expectations we will analyse the period between 1991 and 1996, whereas under the 
perfect foresight assumption the period under analysis is between 1989 and 1993. 
                                                 
18 Note that the moving average (MA) was chosen in order to smooth those series as they were found to be 
quite irregular. For the relative labour costs of each country, the MA is not applied since it has already 
been standardised to the United States attractiveness. 
  23In what concerns labour costs, it is assumed that under static expectations MNEs 
cannot observe the current value of labour costs and expect relative labour costs not to 
change from the last period, as it should in a context of static-looking expectations. 
Conversely, under forward-looking expectations, MNEs are assumed to accurately 
forecast relative labour costs so that entry decisions are based on current values. 
Ideally, the share of capital invested abroad would be proxied by the foreign 
affiliates’ assets held by United States parent companies. However, since data constraints 
preclude us from isolating the affiliates’ assets owned by United States parent 
companies, the share of total assets of United States foreign affiliates, industry of foreign 
affiliate relative to the total assets of the United States parent company, industry of 
United States parent, is used to proxy for the share of capital invested in the foreign 
countries. Finally, for the discount factor we use the United States’ Treasury 5-year bond 
yield. 
MICROECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE 
In this study, the dependent variable is discrete and represented by a three-ordered 
category variable (FD ). When it takes the value one it indicates that the United States 
MNEs have invested in industry j of country i at time t and no employment increase has 
occurred; when it takes the value two it indicates that the United States MNEs have 
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The dependent variable, FD , is an ordered variable characterising the United States 





  24investment capital outflows from United States into industry j of country i, at time t. 
 is the number of employees of the United States affiliates in industry j of country 









Let the underlying response model be: 
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 is the share of United States’ capital invested in industry j of country i, at time t. 
 is the United States’ discount rate, at time t.   is the foreign affiliates’ labour 
costs in industry j of country i relative to United State’s. 
lcijt
US
σ ijt and ρijt
US are the volatility 
and correlation, respectively, of the labour cost in industry j of country i, at time t. 
Let W be the matrix of explanatory variables and β the vector of coefficients, such that: 
Ws h f l c = 1| | | | | µ σ ρ  and β β β β β β β
T= 012345 . 
The number of observations is given by: N  under the static 
expectations’ scenario and N  under forward-looking expectations’ 
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Tij is six (1991-1996) for the former 
scenario and five (1989-1993) for the latter, for all i and j. 
The variable  is not observable, but we know which of the three categories it 






US =1  if i f d  falls in category k, with k =1,2. 
Eijt
US = 0 otherwise. 
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where   is a constant such that c ck 0 0 = ,  c 1 c =  and c2 = +∞;   is the vector of 
explanatory variables; and F  is the cumulative distribution of 
wijt
⋅ af ε ijt. Generally the 
logistic and normal distributions are adopted
19. The logistic distribution is similar to the 
normal distribution, except for the tails, which are considerably heavier (see Cox, 1970). 
Contrary to the binary case, the similarity
20 between probit and logit no longer holds 
under the present specification, leading to very distinct inference (see Hsiao, 1986). 
Moreover, the answer to the question of which distribution to use is very difficult to 
justify on theoretical grounds (Greene, 1993; Baltagi, 1995; Hsiao, 1986; Maddala, 
1983). In this application, we present the results for the ordered probit and logit. Since 
we have panel data, we need to control for unobserved characteristics of the individuals, 
µij, in order to get a consistent estimator. 
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The results are presented for two separate cases. In the general case, it is only analysed 
whether entry occurs or not (see Table 1). The results for this case are presented for the 
fixed effects logit model and random effects probit model, in which the dependent 
variable is binary
21 under both the static expectations and forward-looking expectations’ 
hypotheses. A more specific case where entry is broken down into two different 
categories, entry without employment and entry with employment is then analysed using 
an ordered probit model. For the ordered probit model we also report the results under 
                                                 


























20 For the similarity between binomial logit and probit models see Amemiya (1981). 
21 When it takes the value one it indicates that the United States’ MNE has invested in industry j of 
country i at time t, and zero otherwise, such as:   and  . In 
this case, positive capital outflows ( ) are used to signal overall entry events. 













  26the static expectations’ hypothesis and forward-looking expectations’ hypothesis (see 
Table 2). 
The results of the binary dependent variable model are presented in Table 1. Table 1 
is arranged into two main sections, the first is composed of columns (1)-(5), which 
correspond to the model under static-looking expectations’ hypothesis and the other 
composed of columns (6)-(10), which correspond to the model under the forward-
looking expectations’ hypothesis. In the first column of each section, the maximum 
likelihood estimation’s (MLE) results for the standard logit model are presented whilst 
the second column reports the fixed effects logit model’s results. The null hypothesis of 
the Hausman’s (1978) test is not rejected, hence both the standard maximum likelihood 
logit estimator and the Chamberlain's (1980) estimator are consistent, but the 
Chamberlain's estimator is inefficient, under both expectations’ hypotheses. Finally, in 
the third and fourth columns of each section, the results of the binomial probit model and 
the random effects probit model
22 are presented. The marginal effects
23 of the random 
effects probit model are given in last columns of each section. 
As we may observe in Table 1, for both standard logit and probit models, the overall 
significance
24 of the regressors is not rejected at 1 percent significance level, under both 
expectations’ hypotheses. The random effects specification is also not rejected at 6 
percent under the static expectations’ hypothesis and 8 percent under the forward-
looking expectations’ hypothesis. The coefficient estimates all have the correct signs, 
with the exception of the share of FDI (shf ) variable. The best-fit model, as suggested by 
the measures of goodness of fit
25, appears to be the random effects probit model, under 
                                                 
22 See Buttler and Mofit (1982), Hsiao (1986) and Baltagi (1995). 
23 The partial derivatives of probabilities with respect to the vector of characteristics are computed at the 
means of the exogenous variables using all observations. 
24  To test the joint hypothesis that the k slopes in the regression are equal to zero we resort to the 
likelihood ratio statistic (LR), which follows a chi-square with k degrees of freedom (see Greene, 1993). 
25 As Maddala (1992) and Greene (1993) suggest we may think of the goodness fit of the model in terms 
  27both expectations’ hypothesis with the highest likelihood ratio index (LRI)
26 and pseudo 
Zavoina and McKelvey (ZM) R-square
27 relatively to the standard specification. 
TABLE 1 - BINOMIAL LOGIT AND PROBIT MODELS
Dependent variable is FDI* Static Expectations Forward-Looking Expectations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Logit Logit Probit Probit Marginal Logit Logit Probit Probit Marginal
Fixed Random Effects Fixed Random Effects
Effects Effects Effects Effects
Constant 0.495 0.335 0.343 0.088 0.473 0.345 0.361 0.094
p-value (0.542) (0.463) (0.468) (0.467) (0.367) (0.252) (0.227) (0.221)
Share of FDI 0.056 0.017 0.033 0.036 0.009 0.020 0.169 0.011 0.013 0.003
p-value (0.148) (0.918) (0.130) (0.151) (0.153) (0.621) (0.318) (0.631) (0.627) (0.627)
Discount Rate 0.230 0.233 0.132 0.137 0.035 0.161 0.174 0.089 0.093 0.024
p-value (0.068) (0.072) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.024) (0.019) (0.028) (0.022) (0.022)
Relative Labour Costs -0.622 0.320 -0.367 -0.377 -0.097 -0.406 0.663 -0.242 -0.251 -0.066
p-value (0.002) (0.673) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.060) (0.473) (0.056) (0.063) (0.060)
Volatility -1.047 -0.851 -0.614 -0.609 -0.157 -0.810 -1.360 -0.509 -0.535 -0.140
p-value (0.054) (0.317) (0.050) (0.091) (0.091) (0.216) (0.230) (0.179) (0.179) (0.174)
Correlation 0.034 -0.103 0.019 0.013 0.003 0.505 0.496 0.291 0.297 0.078
p-value (0.788) (0.513) (0.787) (0.858) (0.858) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rho 0.076 0.083
p-value (0.175) (0.190)
No. Observations 936 936 936 936 936 780 780 780 780 780
Log likelihood function -446.1 -233.6 -445.9 -444.1 -373.6 -175.1 -373.5 -372.0
Restricted log likelihood -453.9 -453.9 -445.9 -387.5 -387.5 -373.5
LR (Chi-square) 15.493 15.958 3.658 27.915 27.960 3.056
Degrees of Freedom 5 5 1 5 5 1
Significance (0.008) (0.007) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.080)
LRI 0.017 0.018 0.022 0.036 0.036 0.040
Pseudo R-SQR 0.810 0.810 0.810 0.801 0.801 0.801
NAÏVE R-SQR 0.811 0.811 0.811 0.803 0.803 0.803
Pseudo ZM R-SQR 0.335 0.339 0.352 0.357
Hausman Test 3.226 3.478
Degrees of Freedom 5 5
Significance 0.665 0.627
i)  P-values corresponding to Maximum Likelihood Estimation are reported in parentheses.
ii) The Restricted log likelihood for the random effects probit model is for Rho=0  
The results of the random effects probit model under the static expectations’ 
hypothesis (column 4) suggest a positive and significant coefficient at 6 percent for the 
United States’ discount rate and a positive but not significant coefficient for the 
correlation between the labour cost of United States and the foreign location. A negative 
and highly significant coefficient for the relative labour costs and a negative and 
significant at 9 percent coefficient for the volatility that the United States’ investors face 
in the foreign location. However the coefficient estimate for the share of capital already 
invested in a specific industry of a specific country has not the expected sign but it is not 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the proportion of the corrected predictions, resulting in the Pseudo and Naïve R-squares. 
26 The LRI results from MacFadden (1974). 
27 See Zavoina and McKelvey (1975) 
  28significantly different from zero. 
Under the hypothesis of static expectations the data predicts that, at the sample means 
(see column 5), the negative effect of variations in labour costs’ volatility, σ , on the 
probability of United States’ entry is 0.157 whereas the positive effect of correlation, ρ, 
on the probability of entry is 0.003. Changes in relative labour costs, lc, affect negatively 
the probability of entry by 0.097, and the discount rate, µ, affects positively the 
probability of entry by 0.035. Though not supported by the model’s predictions, in this 
econometric application the share of United States’ capital already invested in a specific 
country’s industry, shf , affects positively the probability by 0.009. 
The results of the random effects probit model, under the forward-looking 
expectations’ hypothesis (columns 9 and 10) suggest a positive and significant 
coefficient at 2 percent for the United States’ discount rate and a positive and highly 
significant coefficient for the correlation between the labour cost of United States and the 
foreign location. The changes in these variables affect the probability of entry by 0.024 
and by 0.078, respectively. A negative and significant at 6 percent coefficient for the 
relative labour costs and a negative and significant at 17 percent coefficient for the 
volatility that the United States’ investors face in the foreign location are found. The 
probability of entry is affected negatively by variations in relative labour costs and 
volatility in the foreign location by 0.06 and 0.14, respectively. However, the coefficient 
estimate for the share of capital already invested in a specific industry of a specific 
country has not the expected sign but it is not significantly different from zero. 
The random effects probit model under the static-looking and forward-looking 
expectations’ hypotheses does not replicate the predictions of the analytical model as far 
as the share of capital invested is concerned. This could be due to the fact that the proxy 
for the attractiveness of the foreign location used in this application is the labour cost per 
  29employee whilst entry is, in this case, solely defined by net capital outflows. Thus, it 
seems to be more sensible to define FDI-entry also in terms of employment. Therefore, 
in what follows, the data are analysed using a second criterion for entry, the United 
States affiliates number of employees (EM). This results in three-ordered categories for 
the entry events of the United States MNEs. 
TABLE 2 - ORDERED PROBIT MODEL
Dependent variable is FDI Static Expectations         Forward-Looking Expectations
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
Ordered Marginal Marginal Marginal Ordered Marginal Marginal Marginal
Probit Effects Effects Effects Probit Effects Effects Effects
LD-MLE (FDI=0) (FDI=1) (FDI=2) LD-MLE (FDI=0) (FDI=1) (FDI=2)
Constant 0.463 -0.0680 -0.0455 0.1134 0.236 -0.0346 -0.0235 0.0581
p-value (0.435) (0.573)
Share of FDI -0.001 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.002 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0006
p-value (0.956) (0.946)
Discount Rate 0.236 -0.0346 -0.0231 0.0577 0.221 -0.0324 -0.0220 0.0544
p-value (0.009) (0.000)
Relative Labour Costs -0.414 0.0609 0.0407 -0.1016 -0.443 0.0650 0.0441 -0.1091
p-value (0.010) (0.043)
Volatility -1.070 0.1572 0.1051 -0.2624 -0.939 0.1379 0.0935 -0.2315
p-value (0.028) (0.134)






No. Observations 936 936 936 936 780 780 780 780
Log likelihood function -966.5 -793.6
Restricted log likelihood (Rho=0) -968.7 -796.0
Wald test (DF=5) 21.02 39.90
Significance (0.001) (0.000)
LR (Chi-square, DF=1) 4.44 4.85
Significance (0.035) (0.028)
LRI 0.012 0.029
Pseudo ZM R-SQR 0.727 0.758
i)  P-values corresponding to Maximum Likelihood Estimation are reported in parentheses.  
Table 2 presents the ML results concerning the ordered probit model with a logistic 
distribution (LD) of the original model under the static-looking expectations hypothesis 
(columns 1 to 4) and under the forward-looking expectations’ hypothesis (columns 5 to 
8). Under both hypotheses we do not reject the overall significance of the regressors with 
the Wald test and we do not reject the random effects specification with the LR test at 5 
percent significance. The pseudo ZM R-square is of 0.727 and 0.758 for the model under 
static and forward-looking expectations’ hypotheses, respectively. Comparing these 
  30values with those given in Table 1, the measure of goodness of fit improves 
considerably, being twice that in the binomial model, which underscores the superiority 
of the ordered specification relative to binary one. 
The ML estimates of the ordered probit model under both expectations’ hypotheses 
suggest, as expected, a negative though not significant coefficient for the share of capital 
already invested in a specific country’s industry, a positive and significant coefficient for 
the United States’ discount rate, a positive and significant coefficient for the correlation 
between the labour cost of United States and the foreign location, under the forward-
looking expectations’ hypothesis but not significant under the static-looking 
expectations’ hypothesis. We also found a negative and significant coefficient for the 
relative labour costs and a negative and significant coefficient for the volatility that the 
United States’ investors face in the foreign location, under static-looking expectations, 
but not significant under the forward-looking expectations’ hypothesis. 
In regard to the marginal effects displayed in the second to fourth columns of each 
section, notice that a constant had to be included in the regression to ensure that the 
marginal effects sum up to zero
28. Under both hypotheses we obtain similar marginal 
effects for the United States’ share of FDI, discount rate and relative labour costs’ 
variables. The probability of entry with employment (FDI=2) is affected negatively by 
the change in the share of FDI by around 0.0005, positively by variations in the discount 
rate by 0.05 and negatively by the relative labour costs by 0.1. On the other hand, the 
probability of no entry events (FDI=0) is affected positively by the share of FDI and the 
relative labour productivity and negatively by the discount rate by around 0.0003, 0.06 
and 0.03, respectively. 
                                                 
28 Note that, since the interpretation of the marginal effects concerning entry without employment (third 
column of each section in Table 2), is ambiguous (see Greene, 1993), we concentrate the discussion on the 
signs of the changes in the probability of FDI=0 and FDI=2. 
  31With respect to the variables that make up for the uncertainty in the model, namely 
volatility and correlation of labour costs, the results vary with the two expectations’ 
assumptions. Under static expectations’ hypothesis, the volatility of labour costs affects 
negatively the probability of entry with employment (FDI=2) by 0.26, and positively the 
probability of no entry (FDI=0) by 0.16. These estimated marginal effects are higher than 
under the forward-looking expectations’ hypothesis, which stand at 0.23 and 0.14, 
respectively. On the other hand, the effect of the correlation between the foreign location 
and United States’ labour costs appears to be higher under the forward-looking than the 
static expectations’ hypothesis. The correlation affects positively the probability of entry 
with employment (FDI=2) by 0.09 under forward-looking expectations and by 0.01 
under static looking expectations’ hypothesis. On the other hand, it affects negatively the 
probability of no entry (FDI=0) by 0.05 under forward-looking expectations and by 
0.007 under the static hypothesis. 
It is worth noting that although the qualitative response of entry to the different 
explanatory variables is similar, the quantitative impact differs among the two different 
expectations’ formation assumptions. Such discrepancy is explained not only by 
differences in the specification of the respective equation, but also because the small 
period spanned by the data implies that the effective sample differs quite dramatically for 
the two alternative expectations’ models. Therefore, the quantitative results obtained for 
each specification do not lend themselves to direct comparison. Moreover, due to the 
quite contrasting underlying assumptions of both expectations’ hypotheses, the results 
must be interpreted in a different fashion. In fact, as opposed to the forward-looking 
hypothesis, volatility and correlation in the static expectations’ hypothesis translate into 
uncertainty. This follows from the fact that, first, the higher the underlying volatility of 
labour costs abroad, the more volatile that variable becomes and so the higher the 
  32uncertainty associated with FDI-entry. Second, the lower the correlation between home 
and foreign labour costs the more volatile relative labour cost turns out to be and 
consequently the more uncertainty is faced by prospective foreign investors. Conversely, 
since under the forward-looking expectations’ hypothesis firms are assumed to 
accurately predict future movements of all variables, volatility and correlation do amount 
to variability but not uncertainty. It follows that uncertainty does not have any bearing on 
the decision-making of firms endowed with forward-looking expectations, but 
irreversibility still does. What can be drawn from the similarity of the qualitative results 
is that the predictions of the analytical model developed earlier are robust to both 
specifications. 
Although the data do not reject the forward-looking behaviour of the United States’ 
investors, such behaviour is somewhat at odds with the uncertain environment in which 
any investment decisions are taken. As a result, for the purpose of analysing the overall 
results (see Table 3), we will concentrate on the static expectations’ model. 
TABLE 3 - SUMMARY RESULTS
Static Expectations Forward-Looking Expectations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logit Probit Ordered Logit Probit Ordered
Fixed Random Probit Fixed Random Probit
Effects Effects LD-MLE Effects Effects LD-MLE
Constant      +      +      +      +
Share of FDI      +      +      -      +      +      -
Discount Rate      + (*)      + (*)      + (***)      + (**)      + (**)      + (***)
Relative Labour Costs      +      - (***)      - (***)      +      - (*)      - (**)
Volatility      -      - (*)      - (**)      -      -      -
Correlation      -      +      +      + (***)      + (***)      + (***)
Note: The symbol (***) denotes significance at 1% level, (**) at 5% and (*) at 10%  
The estimated negative effect of the share of FDI on entry, although not significantly 
different from zero, reflects the fact that the more capital a firm commits to its foreign 
operations, the more vulnerable it becomes to the uncertainty pertaining to the labour 
costs of the foreign locations. The result by which the discount rate affects entry 
positively is in line with the stochastic model presented before, and is explained by the 
  33fact that a higher time-preference raises the opportunity cost of not starting reaping 
immediately the proceeds of investment. The estimated negative relation between FDI-
entry and relative labour costs is a trivial outcome. However, the remarkable feature of 
the present results is the fact that the bearing of attractiveness on the probability of entry 
comes second to the impact of volatility. The relevance of such a result in the present 
context is that, by highlighting the importance of uncertainty on FDI decisions, it lends 
overwhelming support to the analytical framework proposed in the first part of the paper. 
Indeed, the estimated strong negative effect of volatility on FDI suggests that in the 
presence of a positive degree of irreversibility of investment and uncertainty regarding 
future events, firms worry that gains may turn into losses, in which scenario pulling-out 
their investment could entail considerable costs. The estimated correlation coefficient, in 
spite of having the correct sign, is statistically not significant might. This might be due to 
the fact our sample contemplates a wide spectrum of countries, each of which attracting 
qualitatively and quantitatively different FDI flows from the United States. Since entry 
events in our application are not scaled by the importance of each country as a 
destination of United States FDI, the result that MNEs target predominantly countries 
similar to the home market might not show up in the estimation results. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper presents an “option-pricing” model with the aim of analysing the optimal 
timing and probability of FDI-entry in a context of uncertainty and irreversibility 
concerning FDI ventures. The results of our model reveal that optimal FDI-entry should 
take longer the higher the uncertainty regarding the future path of attractiveness in both 
locations and the higher the share of capital committed by the firm to the foreign 
location. Conversely, the higher the level of foreign attractiveness relative to that at 
home, the higher the discount rate and correlation between attractiveness in both 
  34locations, the relatively sooner should the option of FDI be exercised. 
With the aim of empirically testing the ‘option-pricing’ model, a discrete-variable 
econometric model that uses labour cost as the proxy for (the reciprocal) of attractiveness 
is estimated for a 1990s sample of United States MNEs’ FDI into a panel of developed 
and developing countries, under both static and forward-looking expectations 
hypotheses. The results of the econometric estimation suggest that the theoretical model 
can explain the entry events of United States FDI under the hypotheses of static and 
forward expectations. Indeed, as predicted, FDI-entry depends negatively on the 
volatility of foreign locations’ attractiveness, on relative labour costs and on the share of 
capital already invested in that location. The entry of firms depends positively on the 
discount rate and on the correlation between the attractiveness of home and host 
countries. Thus, the overall empirical results, by suggesting that FDI-entry depends not 
only on the relative attractiveness but crucially on the uncertainty surrounding the future 
path of attractiveness, corroborate the implications of our analytical model. 
  35APPENDIX 
A. Comparative Statics 
Here the derivatives referred to in the main text are presented. The derivatives of the 
critical ratio with respect to the various parameters are computed taking into 
consideration the assumptions made in the main text, which will prove instrumental in 
ascertaining the signs of some of the derivatives. To these assumptions, it is added for 
ease of calculations, that σ σ σ hf = = , which allows us to write equation (24) in the 
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The simulations relate to the critical ratio obtained in equation (24). These simulations 
are conducted with reference to a benchmark case. 
The values of the parameters considered in the benchmark case, as well as the ranges 
used in the simulations of the critical ratio, were drawn from a panel data set of United 
States’ MNEs investing into some European Union Countries (France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain and UK), the Southeast Asian “New Tiger Countries” (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines) and into Canada and Mexico, during the period 
1992-1996. The attractiveness of the foreign country is proxied by the labour 
  37productivity (GDP per employee per hour, US$), from the World Competitiveness 
Yearbook (WCY) for the period. Thus, the parameters pertaining to the equations of the 
critical ratio are defined as: 
Sigma Volatility of Labour Productivity, is the standard deviation of the logarithm of 
labour productivity of the threes years prior to entry. 
Rho   Correlation is the correlation between the logarithm of labour productivity of the 
foreign country relative to the United States of the threes years prior to entry. 
Mu   The Discount Rate is the United States’ Treasury 5-year bond yield, from the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
Share  Since the data on the share of capital invested is not available, the benchmark 
value and the range of variation for both shares were picked arbitrarily according 
to what seems to be reasonably faithful to the underlying reality. 
The table below presents the range as well as the mean for each parameter according to 
the data set specification above. The mean values are used to define the benchmark case 
while the maximum and the minimum values bound the range used for the simulations of 
the critical ratio. 
 MEAN MAXIMUM MINIMUM 
Share H  0.9  0.99  0.51 
Share F  0.1  0.49  0.01 
Mu 6.116  6.690 5.140 
Sigma H  0.044  0.07  0.02 
Sigma F  0.123  0.959  0.01 
Rho 0.374  1  -1 
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  40C. Data Appendix 
 
TABLE 1  I1 - All Industries 
  
I2 - PETROLEUM    
Oil and gas extraction   Tobacco products  
Crude petroleum extraction (no refining) and natural gas  Textile products and apparel  
Oil and gas field services   Lumber, wood, furniture, and fixtures  
Petroleum and coal products   Paper and allied products  
Integrated petroleum refining and extraction   Printing and publishing  
Petroleum refining without extraction   Rubber products  
Petroleum and coal products, nec   Miscellaneous plastics products  
Petroleum wholesale trade   Glass products  
Other   Stone, clay, and other nonmetallic mineral products  
Instruments and related products  
I3 - MANUFACTURING   Other  
I4 - Food and kindred products   I10 - WHOLESALE TRADE  
Grain mill and bakery products   Durable goods  
Beverages   Nondurable goods  
Other  
I11 - FINANCE (EXCEPT BANKING),
INSURANCE, AND REAL ESTATE  
I5 - Chemicals and allied products   Finance, except banking  
Industrial chemicals and synthetics   Insurance  
Drugs   Real estate  
Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods   Holding companies  
Agricultural chemicals  
Chemical products, nec   I12 - SERVICES  
Hotels and other lodging places  
I6 - Primary and fabricated metals   Business services  
Primary metal industries   Advertising  
Ferrous   Equipment rental (ex automotive and computers)  
Nonferrous   Computer and data processing services  
Fabricated metal products   Business services, nec  
Automotive rental and leasing  
I7 - Machinery, except electrical   Motion pictures, including television tape and film  
Farm and garden machinery   Health services  
Construction, mining, and materials handling machinery  Engineering, architectural, and surveying services  
Office and computing machines   Management and public relations services  
Other   Other  
I8 - Electric and electronic equipment  I13 - OTHER INDUSTRIES  
Household appliances   Agriculture, forestry, and fishing  
Radio, television, and communication equipment   Mining  
Electronic components and accessories   Metal mining  
Electrical machinery, nec   Nonmetallic minerals  
Construction  
I9 - Other manufacturing   Transport  
Transport equipment (Motor vehicles and equipment   Communication and public utilities  
and Others)  Retail trade  
 
  41Data Sources 
Capital Outflows: The source for the FDI capital outflows is the BEA. The direct 
investment capital outflows consist of equity capital outflows
29, reinvested earnings
30, 
and intercompany debt outflows
31. 
Direct investment capital outflows exclude transactions between two U.S. persons, 
because transactions between U.S. persons are not considered international, even if 
cross-border transactions are involved. Thus, if one U.S. person purchases a direct 
investment interest in a foreign affiliate from another U.S. person, the new owner will 
establish or increase its ownership interest in the foreign affiliate, but no equity capital 
outflow is recorded, because the transaction occurs entirely within the United States. In 
addition, there is no net increase in U.S. claims on foreign countries; instead, one U.S. 
person's claims have merely been substituted for those of another. 
Employment: The number of employees is defined as the full-time and part-time 
employees on the payroll at the end of fiscal year
32, extracted from the Bureau of 
economic Analysis (BEA) of the United States’ Commerce Department. 
Share of FDI: The share of total assets of United States’ foreign affiliates
33, industry 
of foreign affiliate relative to the total assets of the United States’ parent company
34, 
                                                 
29 Equity capital outflows are net increases in U.S. parents' equity in their foreign affiliates. Equity capital 
inflows (decreases in equity) are netted against equity capital outflows (increases in equity) to derive the 
net outflow. 
30 Reinvested earnings of foreign affiliates are earnings less distributed earnings. Earnings are U.S. 
parents' shares in the net income of their foreign affiliates after the provision for foreign income taxes. 
Note that, because reinvested earnings are not actually transferred to the U.S. parent, they increase the 
parent's investment in its affiliate. Thus, an entry equal to the value of reinvested earnings is made in the 
direct investment income account, and a similar entry, but with the opposite sign, is made in the direct 
investment capital account. 
31 Intercompany debt outflows consist of the increase in U.S. parents' net intercompany debt receivables 
from their foreign affiliates during the year, as they are recorded in the financial records of the U.S. 
parents. 
32 An affiliate's fiscal year is defined as the financial reporting year that ended in that calendar year. 
33 The foreign affiliates' total assets are equal to the sum of total owners' equity in affiliates held by both 
U.S. parents and all other persons and total liabilities owed by affiliates to both U.S. parents and all other 
persons. 
34 A U.S. parent is a U.S. person who has direct investment, that is, a 10 percent or more direct or indirect 
ownership interest in a foreign business enterprise. 
  42industry of U.S. parent, from the Bureau of economic Analysis (BEA) of the United 
States’ Commerce Department. 
Discount Rate: United States’ Treasury 5-year bond yield extracted from the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
Relative Labour Costs: Labour costs of the countries in the panel relatively to the 
United States
35, during the period 1988 to 1996  
The affiliates’ wages per employee are extracted from the ratio of employment 
compensation to the number of employees in industry of foreign affiliate, from the 
Bureau of economic Analysis (BEA) of the United States’ Commerce Department. The 
employment compensation (wages and salaries per employee) data cover the full year. 
Volatility: There are two assumptions on the calculation of this variable. (1) Static 
expectations: calculated as the moving average of the standard deviation of the logarithm 
of host country’s labour costs, at industry level, from the three years (excluding the year 
under observation) prior to the date of entry. (2) Forward-looking expectations: defined 
as before but using the data for the three years (excluding the year under observation) 
after the entry occurred. 
Correlation: defined as the moving average of the correlation between the logarithm of 
host country and United Sates’ labour costs, at industry level, following the criteria 
explained for volatility above. 
                                                 
35 The United States’ labour costs are proxied by the ratio of employment compensation to number of 
employees of U.S. parent companies, industry of parent. 
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